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"PRENATAL ADOPTION": THE VATICAN'S PROPOSAL TO
THE IN VITRO FERTILIZATION DISPOSITION DILEMMA
The inability to bear and rear a child is one of the greatest
hardships that an individual can experience. "Infertility often implicates
the most fundamental feelings about self and one's relation to the natural
order, and may leave persons feeling handicapped or defective in an area
central to personal identity and fulfillment."' For some infertile couples
who cannot naturally conceive offspring, in vitro fertilization ("IVF")2 is
the answer.' With the advancement of modem technology, the process of
freezing the fertilized eggs, or cryopreservation,4 gives the infertile couple
a better chance of becoming pregnant.5 Although this cryopreservation
process gives couples better chances in the IVF process, it also brings
along with it troubling medical, ethical, and legal issues.6
The world's first IVF baby, Louise Brown, was born on July 25,
' John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, And Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure Of The New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 942 (1968).
2 Id. at 944. The process of in vitro fertilization involves a sophisticated treatment
where mature eggs are obtained through a surgical procedure and fertilized outside of the
body. Id. After fertilization occurs, they are placed back into the woman's uterus. Id.
'See generally id. See also infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
"See Clifton Perry and L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall
Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 468 (1992). Cryopreservation is the freezing of
the fertilized eggs in order to preserve them. Id. See also infra notes 46-65 and accompanying
text.
Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, Special Report Frozen Embryos: Policy Issues
1985,312 NEw ENG. J. OF MEID. 1584, 1584-85 (1985) (stating that with the cryopreservation
process there is no need for repeated IVF surgical procedures).
6 See Knoppers & LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception:
Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 329 (1991). "More than a decade after
the birth of Louise Brown and after 12,000 other births by in vitro fertilization, over 100
reports of special commissions worldwide exist on the ethical and legal issues." Id. See
generally G. Smith 11, Australia's Frozen "Orphan" Embryos: A Medical, Legal, and
Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27 (1985-86) (discussing some of the issues raised by [VF
and cryopreservation).
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1978 in Great Britain.7 In December 1981, the first IVF baby was born in
the United States.' The IVF process spread remarkably,9 despite the
procedure's expense, ° stressfullness," and low success rates. 2 It has been
nineteen years since the advent of the IVF process, and over those years,
legal problems have arisen."' The most controversial issue pertaining to
IVF concerns the disposition of the frozen embryo 4 and that it is not going
7 Robertson, supra note 1, at 463-64. Drs. Edwards and Steptoe were the first to
achieve the birth of an IVF baby. Id.; see also L. BROWN & J. BROWN, OUR MIRACLE CHILD
CALLED LOUISE, A P.ARENTS STORY (1979) (describing their perspective of being the parents of
the first IVF baby).
' Bill E. Davidoff, Frozen Embryos: A Need For Thawing In The Legislative
Process, 47 SMU L. REV. 131 (1993); Denise Grady, How to Coax New Life Advances in
Reproductive Techniques Give Couples Hope for Children Once Considered Impossible to
Conceive, TIME, Sept. 18, 1996, at 36 (stating that since the birth of the first U.S. IVF baby,
there have been 26,000 more births in the U.S.).
9 See Kathryn Dore Perkins, More Infertile Couples Placing Hope In Clinics,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 1, 1996, at A]. "A decade ago there were 30 clinics in this country
performing what had become known as 'assisted reproduction.' Today there are 300 with
annual revenues of $2 billion." Id.
10 Robertson, supra note 1, at 940-41; see Health Report, TIME, August 8, 1994, at
20. The average cost per test-tube baby is between $67,000 and $114,000. Id. For a couple
who is over the age of 40, the cost averages up to $800,000. Id.
" See Larry Thompson, Fertility with Less Fuss, TIME, Nov. 14, 1994, at 79. The
process can be stressful where the hormone injections can "produce pain, bloating and sharp
mood swings." Id. The woman also "undergoes tedious blood tests and ultrasound
examinations." Id.
1" See Grady, supra note 8, at 36. Of the 400,000 couples who tried IVF, only 18
percent produced children. Id.; see also David Levran et al., Pregnancy Potential of Human
Oocytes - The Effect of Cryopreservation, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1153, 1153 (1990). Even
with considerable improvements in laboratory procedures, methods of egg retrieval, and
techniques of ovarian stimulation, the highest success rate for pregnancy is no more than 25
percent. Id.
13 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997) (involving a dispute
over the disposition of frozen embryos of a divorced couple where the wife wanted to have
embryos implanted in her uterus and the husband wanted them to be turned over to the clinic
for embryo research); see also infra hotes 103-162 and accompanying text.
14 James Walsh, A Bitter Embryo Imbroglio Amid Dramatic Protests and
Universal Unease, Britain Begins Destroying 3,300 Human Embryos, TIME, Aug. 12 1996,
at 10. An embryo contains anywhere from one to eight cells, and "measures no more
than a fifth of a millimeter across, about the size of a period ending this sentence." Id.
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to be used in the original way intended.' 5 This dilemma occurs because
the cryopreservation process allows the embryo to survive outside of the
womb in a frozen state. 6 This controversial issue arises in situations such
as death, divorce, or a dispute between a couple concerning the disposition
of the frozen embryo.17 Since the IVF process made its debut in 1978,
courts have decided issues related to lVF in cases such as Del Zios v.
Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,'" York v. Jones,19 Davis v.
Davis,20 and Kass v. Kass.2' As with case law, statutory authority is also
sparse. To date, only six states have passed legislation relating to IVF and
the disposition of the embryo,22 thereby leaving the fate of the frozen
embryo open and undecided.23
"5 Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 463-64; see also Gina Kolata, Medicine's
Troubling Bonus: Surplus of Human Embryos, N.Y. TivMEs, Mar. 16, 1997, at 1.6Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, "Unwanted, Anonymous, Biological Descendants":
Mandatory Donation Laws and Laws Prohibiting Pre-embryo Discard Violate the
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 183, 184 (1993).
"7 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 132 (explaining that such situations raise complex
problems regarding the disposition because the embryo can survive outside of the womb); see
also Kolata, supra note 15, at 1.
S No. 74-3558, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (involving a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress and tortious conversion of property where a doctor destroyed a
couple's frozen embryo without their permission); see infra notes 109-119 and accompanying
text.
'9717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (involving a suit against an IVF clinic where the
clinic refused to release a couple's frozen embryo); see infra notes 120-134 and accompanying
text.
0842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993) (involving a
dispute over the disposition of frozen embryos of a divorced couple). see infra notes 135-153
and accompanying text.
21 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997) (involving a dispute over the disposition of
frozen embryos of a divorced couple where the wife wanted to have the embryos implanted in
her uterus, and the husband did not); see infra notes 14154-178 and accompanying text.
2 SeeLA.REv. STAT.ANN. §§ 9:123-133 (West 1993); FLA. ST. ANN. § 742.17 (West
1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (c) (1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Baldwin
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (1992).
23 See Michael D. Lemonick, Sorry, Your Time Is Up A Controversial British Law
Targets 3,000 Human Embryo For Disposal, TIME, Aug. 12, 1996, at 41 (stating that the
U.S. does not have a national policy, and that "clinics are generally responsible for setting
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Other countries, such as Great Britain, have addressed this
dilemma by instituting a law mandating the destruction of any frozen
embryos that have been in a cryopreserved state for over five years.24
Appalled by this mass destruction, the Vatican responded by suggesting
"that married women volunteer to bring the embryos to term in 'prenatal
adoption."'25 This idea is neither new nor bizarre, as some IVF clinics
require couples either to implant the frozen embryo in the natural mother,
or donate it for implantation in another woman.26 For example, Louisiana
law requires the mandatory donation of the unused frozen embryo.2 7
However, it has yet to be seen whether such a proposal is allowed under
the United States Constitution.
This Note discusses the Vatican's proposal of "prenatal adoption,"
and whether such a law would be constitutional. Part I of this Note
briefly describes the scientific procedures of the IVF and cryopreservation
processes.28 Part II gives an overview of the legal status of the frozen
embryo, the statutes, and the case law related to IVF.2 9 Part III explores
the Vatican's proposal of "prenatal adoption" and the other options
surrounding frozen embryo disposition.3°  Part IV analyzes the
constitutionally protected right to privacy.1 Finally, Part V concludes that
if the right to privacy analysis is the proper analysis, a statute mandating
the "prenatal adoption" of the unwanted frozen embryo would not infringe
their own guidelines.").
' Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37, § 14 (Eng.); see also Paul
Raeburn, A Delicate Issue Frozen In Time, Bus. WK., July 22, 1996, at 42. "The destruction
is mandated by a British law that says frozen embryos must be discarded after five years, a
countdown that began when the law took effect on Aug. 1, 1991." Id.
' Carrie Dowling, Vatican Suggests "Adoption" of Frozen Embryos, USA TODAY,
July 24, 1996 at IA; see also infra notes 179-210 and accompanying text.
26 See generally Kim Schaefer, In-Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, And The
Right To Privacy--Are Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional?, 22 PAC. L.J. 87 (1990)
(discussing the constitutionality of a mandatory donation law).
2 7See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 1993).
28 See discussion infra Part I.
29 See discussion infra Part II.
30 See discussion infra Part III.
" See discussion infra Part IV.
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on one's right to privacy.1
2
I. THE SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURES OF THE IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND
CRYOPRESERVATION PROCESSES
A. The In Vitro Fertilization Process
The IVF process gives an infertile couple the opportunity to
produce a child who is biologically their own.33 After a couple has met
certain requirements provided by the IVF clinic,34 the woman is placed on
fertility drugs which induce ovulation and increase the number of eggs
produced.35 This process increases the probability of pregnancy because
it allows the physician to implant several embryos at one time. 6 The
physician then surgically removes the eggs from the woman's ovary
through a procedure called laparoscopy.37 In the next step of this process,
32 See discussion infra Part V.
3 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 133.
31 See id. (explaining that a couple's infertility must result "from tubal factors,
mucus abnormalities, immunity to spermatozoa, or male dysfunctions" and the couple must
also undergo a screening process determining their suitability for the program).
31 Id. at 134. This process is sometimes also called "superovulation." Id.
36 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 90. See also Robert M.L. Winston and Alan H.
Handyside, New Challenges In Human In Vitro Fertilization, Sci., May 14, 1993, at 932. The
success rates increase when more than one embryo is transferred simultaneously. Id.
"Pregnancy resulted from thirteen percent (184 out of 436) of transfers when three or fewer
embryos were transferred, twenty-five percent (284 out of 944) with four, and twenty-six
percent (229 out of 871) with five or six embryos." Id.; Peter J. Neumann et al., The Cost of
a Successful Delivery with In Vitro Fertilization, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 239, 240 (1994)
(reporting that "because of the methods of ovarian stimulation used and the practice of
implanting multiple embryos in a woman's uterus to improve the chance of pregnancy, increases
the incidence of multiple births.").
" Richard P. Dickey, The Medical Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REv. 317, 326
(1986). Laparoscopy involves inserting an instrument through the naval to view the eggs, and
then using another instrument to withdraw the fluid containing the eggs from the ovary. Id. See
also Neumann, supra note 34, at 240 (reporting that successful egg retrieval occurs in only
about 86 percent of cycles).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
the eggs are taken to the laboratory and combined with the male's sperm
and placed in an incubator for twelve hours.38 After fertilization occurs,
the woman takes hormones that prepare her body for the fertilized
embryo. 9 Finally, the physician places the embryos into the woman's
uterus when they have reached the four-to-eight cell stage.4" At this point,
pregnancy takes place in the usual manner.41 The statistics report that
some programs have a ninety percent success rate for egg retrieval,
fertilization, and "embryonic cleavage."4" From this process, pregnancy
results at a rate of twenty to twenty-five percent,43 and two-thirds of the
pregnancies result in live births." Although these chances may seem slim,
it is worth the risk to a couple who may never otherwise be parents.45
B. The Cryopreservation Process
In early 1981, doctors announced a development where the IVF
embryo, could be frozen.46 Cryopreservation is a process that involves
freezing the embryo so it can be preserved and implanted at a later date."
The embryo is usually frozen at the two-to-eight cell stage.4" The embryo
culture is first packaged with cryoprotectants.49 The embryo is then placed
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 468.
4t Robertson, supra note 1, at 949.
2 Id. at 940.
13 Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 468; see also Levran et al., supra note 12, at
1153 (reporting that the highest success rate for pregnancy is not more than 25 percent).
4' Robertson, supra note 1, at 940.
43 Id.
46 Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 463.
4' Davidoff, supra note 8, at 134; see also Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 468
(explaining that the cryopreservation process "suspends mitosis or germ cell division"); Levran,
supra note 12, at 1153 (debating whether the chances of a successful pregnancy increase with
cryopreservation since some embryos may be damaged during the freezing process).
4 Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 468.
49 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 134 n. 33 (stating that cryoprotectants replace cellular
water which protect the embryo from the effects of freezing).
762 [Vol. XIV
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in a container for freezing and stored in liquid nitrogen at approximately
minus 1960 Celsius.5" When the woman is ready for implantation, the
frozen embryo is thawed by reversing the process.5 The physician then
implants the embryo using the normal IVF process.52
Before the advent of cryopreservation, there was a problem with
IVF because for health and safety reasons, only three to four embryos
could be implanted at one time.53 As a result, there was an excess of
fertilized embryos, and an ethical dilemma arose as to their disposition.54
Cryopreservation allows for the freezing and storing of the excess
embryos, so they can be implanted at a later date.5 Thus, the freezing
process reduces the number of times the woman must endure the entire
IVF process.56  Another advantage is cost.57  It is significantly less
expensive to implant cryogenically preserved embryos, than to repeat the
entire IVF process several times.58 The most important advantage of the
cryopreservation process is that it allows the woman to "optimize the
timing of embryo transfer in subsequent cycles."59 Although this freezing
50 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 91.
Sl Davidoff, supra note 8, at 134.
52 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 91.
5 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 135.
Id.; see also JOHN YEH & MOLLY ULINE YEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 80
(1991) (stating that the surplus are problematic, and that the only solutions were to destroy them,
implant them all in the woman, donate them to another woman, or use them for medical
research).
55 YEH & YEH, supra note 54, at 84.
"Id.; see also Davidoff, supra note 8, at 135 (explaining that if the initial process fails
to produce a pregnancy, the woman need not go through the entire IVF process again if the
excess embryos are frozen for future use).
7 Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 468.
s Id.; see also Neumann, supra note 36, at 241. The average cost per cycle is
$8,000, and the marginal cost per cycle is $66,667 per delivery. Id. The marginal costs could
rise to as much as $114,286 per delivery for couples attempting six cycles. Id.
59 YEl & YEH, supra note 54, at 84; see also Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 468.
Cryopreservation allows embryo implantation to be postponed until "after the deleterious effects
of the ovarian-stimulating hormone have abated." Id. The capacity of the uterine lining is
temporarily reduced by the hormones, and cannot accept the fertilized embryo. Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIV
process is more efficient and easier on the woman,6" it also preserves the
ethical problems in the disposition of the unneeded embryos.6
In 1984, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
addressed some of the ethical issues pertaining to IVF, and in 1986 they
reported their findings.62 The Ethics Committee report stated that "IVF is
ethically acceptable.""3 The Ethics Committee also noted that the embryo
should be given "special respect," that is, more than is given to human
tissue, but less than is given to human beings. 64 Along with the Ethics
Committee's report, the American Fertility Society issued guidelines "for
establishing minimum training and experience levels for IVF personnel,
given the 'irreplacability of human embryos.' 65
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE FROZEN EMBRYO
What rights, if any, does the frozen embryo possess? Should the
frozen embryo be considered property, human life, or should it be given
special respect as something in between? Although these questions have
made their way into the courtroom, 6 6 the answers do not seem clear. 67
Although the amount of case law concerning the frozen embryo is sparse,
it indicates where the issue of frozen embryo disposition may lead us, and
whether a state could mandate "prenatal adoption" of the frozen embryo.
In order to determine whether mandatory "prenatal adoption" of
60 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 135.
61 Perry & Schneider, supra note 4, at 464 (stating that cryopreservation "merely
lengthens the period of time during which a dispositional decision must be made by someone").
62 Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CoNN. L.
REv. 305, 309 (1993).
63 Id.
6ld., see also infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion
of the "special respect" theory.
6' Feliciano, supra note 62, at 310.
66 See infra notes 105-173 and accompanying text discussing the judicial decisions
pertaining to IVF.
67See Walsh, supra note 14, at 10. "IVF is still so young a technique that legislatures
and courts have not caught up with ethical quandaries arising from it." Id.
764
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the frozen embryo is constitutional, it is essential to determine the legal
status of the frozen embryo.68 There are three theories regarding the status
of the frozen embryo:69 1) the theory that the frozen embryo is property,7"
2) the theory that the frozen embryo is a person,7 and 3) the theory that
the frozen embryo deserves special respect.72 Furthermore, some states
have incorporated IVF into their statutes,7 3 laying the groundwork for the
frozen embryo's legal status.74
A. Is the Frozen Embryo Property, Human Life, or Something in
Between?
Many people argue that the frozen embryo are property because
it is simply "corporeal human tissue. " This theory derives from the fact
that the fertilized embryo is "a collection of six to eight cells which have
no substantive human qualities. 7 6 Those who criticize this theory argue
that viewing the frozen fertilized embryo as property ignores the
tremendous value placed on human life.77
Others argue that the frozen embryo constitutes human life and is
biologically alive.7" This position is supported by scientific proof that: 1)





73See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123-133 (West 1993); FLA. ST. ANN. § 742.17
(West 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (c) (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715
(Baldwin 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (1992).
71 See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123-133 (West 1993).
73 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 138.
76 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 95 (arguing that before Roe v. Wade, "most states made
abortion a lesser crime than homicide, lending support to the belief that the embryo is not
human"); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion as a constitutional right).
7 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 96.
78 Id. at 94. Some recognize these embryos as alive because they are made up of living
cells, which is one of the "fundamental units of life." Id.; see also Kolata, supra note 15, at 1.
Robert Prosser, an embryologist at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center stated that" [w]e treat
766 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIV
embryos contain the unique genes to "become complete human beings;
79
2) embryos will continue to develop as human life;8  3) embryos
metabolize, respond to their environment, and respire;8 and 4) embryos
are deliberately created." Supporters of this theory believe that the frozen
embryo should be given the status of a human, including all of the rights
a human being possesses.83
The third theory--the special respect theory- 84 takes an
intermediate view between the property theory and the human-life
theory.85 The frozen embryo is not given the full status afforded to a
human being, but is not considered mere property either.86 According to
this theory, the embryo is given greater respect than human tissue because
of its potential for life.87 Proponents of this theory respect the embryo as
a "symbol of human life."88 The American Fertility Society has adopted
this position.89
B. State Legislation Regarding In Vitro Fertilization and the Frozen
Embryo
There has been much commentary as to the need for legislation
them [frozen embryos] as though they were viable developing babies." Id.
" Schaefer, supra note 26, at 94.
8 Id.
81Id.
82 See Davidoff, supra note 8, at 137 (stating that because the embryo is created
deliberately, the doctrine of Roe v. Wade does not apply); see also David G. Dickman,
Comment, Social Values in a Brave New World: Toward a Public Policy Regarding Embryo
Statutes and In-Vitro Fertilization, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 817, 830 (1985).
83 See Davidoff, supra note 8, at 137.
Id. at 139.
8' Robertson, supra note 1, at 972.
86 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 96.
87 Id. (stating that the embryo has great symbolic value); see also Davidoff, supra note
8, at 139 (stating the embryo is given special respect because it has great symbolic meaning, it
may never realize its biological potential).
88 Robertson, supra note 1, at 972.
89 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 139.
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regarding IVF and the human embryo. 9  However, few states have
adopted legislation relating to IVF.91 Of those states that have adopted
legislation regarding TVF, the extent to which each state regulates varies.92
1. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, the statue regarding IVF is extremely vague.93 It
does not allow any kind of fetal experimentation on an unborn or live
child.94 However, the statute also adds that this section is not to be
construed as condoning or prohibiting IVF.95
2. Florida
The Florida statute regarding IVF pronounces the law pertaining
to IVF disposition agreements. 6 It provides that a couple shall enter into
a written agreement for the disposition of embryos "in the event of a
divorce, death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen circumstance."97 In
the absence of a written agreement, ownership and decision-making
control remain with the "commissioning couple."98
'See generally id. (arguing that there is a need for federal legislation and regulation
of IVF).
91 See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 123-133 (West 1993); FLA. ST. ANN. § 742.17
(West 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (c) (1989); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.715
(Baldwin 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (1992).
" Compare PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (c) (1989) (stating that nothing in the
section either condones or prohibits in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer), with LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:126 (West 1993) (giving the embryo biological human being status).
9' 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (1989).
94 Id.
9'Id. at § 3216 (c) (1989).
96 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1993).
97 id.
98 Id. The statute also provides that if a child is born from an embryo where the
gamete providers have died before the transfer, that child shall not have a claim against the
decedent's estate unless provided for by the decedent's will. Id. From this, one could
conclude that the Florida legislature had embryo donation in mind.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
3. Kentucky
According to the Kentucky statute, public medical facilities may
be used for research of IVF or the actual process itself, only where the
"procedures do not result in the intentional destruction of a human
embryo."' However, it also states that the section should not be construed
as allowing public funds to pay for IVF procedures.'00
4. Kansas
Kansas' statute pronounces that the "disposition of the product of
in vitro fertilization prior to implantation" is lawful and that the state shall
not prohibit such disposition.101
5. California
In California it is unlawful for anyone to knowingly use embryos
for any purpose other than indicated by the embryo providers. Further, the
statute forbids implantation of an embryo into a recipient who is not the
embryo provider, without the signed written consent of the embryo
providers. Violations of this statute are punishable by imprisonment for
three to five years, or by a fine of up to $50,000.
6. Louisiana
In the State of Louisiana, a human embryo is given the status of a
biological human being. 2 Another section of the statute provides that one
9 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Baldwin 1995).
100 Id. (stating that 'public funds' means any money of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, any department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or any money of any county,
city, agency or instrumentality thereof or any money of any other political subdivisions of the
Commonwealth, agency or instrumentality thereof.").
0I KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (1992).
102 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 1993).
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cannot intentionally destroy an embryo. ' 3 Finally, the statute also states
that any embryo not used in the original way intended will be transferred
to another woman who will adopt the embryo."°4
C. The Frozen Embryo Makes Its Way to the Courts
With all of the ethical and legal problems accompanying the frozen
embryo, it is not surprising that courts have made decisions concerning
disposition disputes.10 5 However, it is surprising that only a small number
of cases have arisen in the eighteen years since IVF has been around.
1. Del Zios v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center.°6
This was the first unreported case involving the frozen embryo. 107
The plaintiffs, Dr. and Mrs. Del Zios, were experiencing fertility problems
due to Mrs. Del Zios's medical problems with her fallopian tubes.' In
1973, the couple sought fertility treatment at the Columbia Presbyterian
Medical Center, where Dr. Sweeney suggested that Mrs. Del Zios could
become pregnant through IVF.' °9 Dr. Sweeney performed the IVF
procedure on Mrs. Del Zios, which produced an embryo."0
The Del Zioses filed suit when Dr. Vande Wiele, the chairman of
the department of gynecology and obstetrics, deliberately destroyed the
Del Zios's embryo by placing it in a freezer."1 Dr. Wiele felt that the
procedure would constitute "an unwarranted practice which posed danger
1o3 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1993).
o LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 1993).
'o' See generally Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 6, at 329.
1"6 No. 74-3588, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978), reprinted in MICHAEL H.





"o Id. at 522-23.
1l SHAPIRO & SPECE JR., supra note 109, at 523.
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to any human life resulting from such experimentation." ' 2 He also felt
that Dr. Sweeney should have obtained the permission from the board
before he performed this procedure.1 3 The Del Zioses sued for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and tortious conversion of their property."1 4
At trial, the jury rejected the conversion claim, but returned a
verdict for $50,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress." 5 The
court also stated that the doctor was wrong to destroy the embryo "without
giving Mrs. Del Zios's physician any prior notice, or an opportunity to
remove the test tube to some other location." 1 6
2. Yorkv. Jones.11
7
The dispute in York concerned one frozen fertilized embryo that
the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. York, sought to have released and transferred
from an IVF clinic in Norfolk, Virginia to another clinic in Los Angeles,
California."' The Yorks, who lived in New Jersey at the time, underwent
several IVF processes." 9 However, at some point during the IVF
processes, the Yorks moved to California 2 ' and decided to have their last
remaining frozen embryo' 2' transferred from the Norfolk clinic to the Los
Angeles clinic.'22 When the Yorks notified the Norfolk clinic of their
intentions, the clinic refused to transfer the remaining embryo.'23 The
,,2 Id. at 524.
113 Id.
"4 Id. at 526.
"' Id. The opinion does not explain what element of conversion the jury found
lacking. Id.
116 SHAPIRO & SPECE JR., supra note 109, at 523.
17 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
1 8 Id. at 422.
"
9 Id. at 423.
120 Id.
,2 Id. at 424. During the last IVF process that Mrs. York underwent, six eggs
were removed from Mrs. York and then fertilized. Id. Five of the six embryos were implanted
in Mrs. York, and the sixth embryo was cryogenically preserved. Id.
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Yorks filed suit, and the clinic responded by making a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'24
The court implicitly adopted the "embryo as property theory"'' 25 by
noting that a bailor-bailee relationship was created.'26  The
cryopreservation agreement between the Yorks and the clinic created a
bailment because the clinic had legal possession of the embryo and had the
duty to account for it.'27 The court stated that when the purposes of the
bailment relationship have terminated, "there is an absolute obligation to
return the subject matter of the bailment to the bailor."'25 The court found
that the agreement between the parties recognized the York's property
rights and limited the clinic's rights as bailee.'29 The court denied the
clinic's motion to dismiss, 3 ° and eventually, the case settled.'
3. Davis v. Davis.
32
This case made its way up to the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
where the court decided the fate of seven frozen embryos. 3 3 A divorced
couple, Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis, were arguing over the
disposition of their cryogenically preserved embryos resulting from IVF
procedures.' Mrs. Davis wanted to donate the remaining frozen embryos
to another infertile couple, while Mr. Davis wanted them to be
124 Id. at 423.
2' Id. at 425. The court makes no analysis as to whether the frozen embryo is
property or not, but just assumes that it is. The court seems to infer this from the language of
the cryopreservation agreement between the parties.
126 Id. The court states that for a bailment "all that is needed is the element of
lawful possession.., and duty to account for the thing as property of another." Id.
127 717 F. Supp. at 425.
1
28 Id.
129 Id. at 427.
3 /d. at 429.
131 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 147.
132 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
id. at 589.
134 Id. The couple agreed as to the dissolution of marital property, except for the
seven frozen embryos. Id.
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destroyed. '35
The trial court held that the frozen embryos were "human beings"
and awarded "custody" to Mrs. Davis so that she could have them
implanted.' 36 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding and
concluded that Mr. Davis had a "constitutionally protected right not to
beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place" and that "there is no
compelling state interest to justify ordering implantation against the will of
either party. '
137
The Supreme Court of Tennessee stated that although the Davises
had an interest in the nature of ownership and disposition of the embryos,
the interest was not a true property interest.38 The court concluded that
frozen fertilized embryos deserve "special respect because of their
potential for human life."' 39 The court also noted that the essential issue
was whether the parties would become parents. 4 ' The court concluded
that the answer to this dilemma "turns on the parties' exercise of their
constitutional right to privacy.""' The court discussed the cases where the
Supreme Court held that the right to procreate was "one of the basic civil
rights of man."' 42 The court also noted that "the right of procreational
autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance--the right to
135 Id. at 590. Originally, when the case began, Mrs. Davis wanted the frozen
embryos to be implanted in her, and Mr. Davis wanted the embryos to remain in their frozen
state until he figured out "whether or not he wanted to become a parent outside the bounds of
marriage." Id. at 589. However, by the time this case made its way to the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, both parties had remarried, and changed their positions. Id. at 590.
.
36 Id. at 589.
"' 842 S.W.2d at 598. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
entry of an order giving both parties "joint control ... and equal voice over their disposition"
because both parties shared an interest in their frozen embryos. Id.
"sId. at 597.
1 Id. The court rejected the theory that frozen embryos are either "property" or
"persons." Id. at 594-95. See also supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
... Id. at 598. The court states that asking the question of whether the embryos are
property or not is helpful in determining the enforceability of disposition agreements. Id.
141 Id.
142 842 S.W.2d at 600 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541).
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
procreate and the right to avoid procreation. 143
The court held that in disputes concerning the disposition of a
frozen embryo, a court should look first at "preferences of the
progenitors," 144 and if there is a dispute, then a court should look at the
prior agreement pertaining to the disposition of the embryo. 145 If, in a case
such as this one, there is no prior agreement, the court stated that it must
resolve the dispute over "constitutional imports" '46 and weigh the interests
of both parties.'47 The court noted that "the party wishing to avoid
procreation should prevail" if the other party has other reasonable means
of procreating. 48 If that party has no reasonable means of procreating,
then the court will consider their argument for using the frozen embryo. 1
49
In this case, Mrs. Davis wanted to donate her embryos to another couple,
and the court held that in such a case, "the objecting party obviously has
the greater interest and should prevail."'5 °
4. Kass v. Kass.5'
The dispute in Kass involved the issue of the disposition of five
frozen fertilized embryos.'52 The parties in this case--now divorced--were
arguing over the disposition of the five frozen embryos.' 53 When the
143 Id. at 601 (noting that there are limitations to both rights).
'44Id. at 604.
141 Id. at 592. This was not the case here. The Davises did not sign any prior
disposition agreements, or any consent forms. Id. at 592 n.9. Apparently, the IVF clinic was
moving its location, and there was no time to postpone the procedure until the appropriate forms
were located. Id.
'6Id. at 603. "[Tlhe issue here centers on the aspects of procreational autonomy-the
right to procreate and the rights to avoid procreation." Id.
141 842 S.W.2d at 604.
148 Id.
149id.
ISo Id. Here, Mr. Davis objected to the donation of the frozen embryos, so the
court ruled that the Knoxville Fertility Clinic could destroy them. Id. at 605.
... 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997)
"' Id. at 584.
153 id.
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Kasses underwent IVF treatments, they signed an informed consent
document'54 which provided in pertinent part:
In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy
or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition
of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our
desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the
IVF Program to:
(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF
Program for biological studies and be disposed of by the
IVF Program for approved research investigation as
determined by the IVF Program. 55
During the divorce proceedings, the parties executed a document which
set forth their understanding of what was previously agreed to in the
informed consent document as to the disposition of the remaining frozen
embryos. "'56 However, Mrs. Kass had a change of heart and wanted to
have the embryos implanted in her uterus.'57 Mr. Kass wanted to have
them turned over for embryo research, as provided for in the informed
consent document. 1
58
The trial court awarded Mrs. Kass the five embryos for
implantation."' The trial court first reasoned that embryos enjoy the status
of something between human life and property. 60 The court stated that,
just as in vivo fertilization, a father's right ends at the moment of
114 Id. at 583.
"1 Id. at 584.
116 663 N.Y.S.2d at 584. The parties executed a document written by Mrs. Kass
for an uncontested divorce. Id.
'Id. at 584-85. Within less than a month, Mrs. Kass filed the present matrimonial




9 Id. at 585.
160 663 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
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fertilization.' The court concluded that the issue of embryo disposition
is a matter exclusively within the mother's discretion.'62 The court further
found that the informed consent document agreed to by the parties was not
dispositive and agreed that in the event of a divorce, a court would
determine the issue of disposition.163 Therefore, the trial court held that
Mrs. Kass was to determine the fate of the five frozen embryos. 16 4
The Appellate Division reversed and held that the informed
consent document and the uncontested divorce instrument clearly stated
the parties' intent that in the event of a divorce, any remaining embryos
were to be donated for scientific research.'65 The court first criticized the
lower court's analysis and stated that it had committed a "fundamental
error."'" The court stated that the Supreme Court was wrong to "[equate]
a prospective mother's decision whether to undergo implantation of pre-
zygotes which are the product of her participation in an IVF procedure
with a pregnant woman's right to exercise exclusive control over the fate
of her non-viable fetus."' 67
Rather, the court found that the first inquiry should be whether the
parties had made an "expression of mutual intent which governs the
disposition of the pre-zygotes under the circumstances in which the parties
find themselves."'68 The court relied on the decision in Davis v. Davis,169







16' 663 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
166 Id. at 585.
167 Id. The court noted that "[a] woman's established right to exercise virtually
exclusive control over her own body is not implicated in the IVF scenario until such time as
implantation actually occurs, for it is only then that her bodily integrity is at issue. Prior to
implantation, that interest is not a relevant and appropriate consideration, and a court must
pursue other analytical avenues in determining whether implantation over the objection of
one of the parties should be permitted or precluded." Id. at 586.1681 d. at 586.
1651d. at 587; See 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). For a more detailed discussion of
Davis v. Davis see supra notes 133-150 and accompanying text.
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determining the disposition of frozen embryos is whether there was a prior
written agreement. 7° The Kass court found that because the Kasses
executed the informed consent document, which was clear and
unambiguous, the embryos would have to be disposed of as provided for
in that agreement.1 71 The court also noted that Mrs. Kass did not meet the
evidentiary standards to permit the balancing test, as used in Davis v.
Davis, which balances the parties' interests in using the embryos. 172
The court concluded that "the decision to attempt to have children
through IVF procedures and the determination of the fate of cryopreserved
pre-zygotes resulting therefrom are intensely personal and essentially
private matters which are appropriately resolved by the prospective
parents rather than the courts."'73 The court determined that if the parties
had entered into a prior agreement indicating their mutual intent regarding
the disposition of any unused frozen embryos, then a court must not
interfere. 174 Therefore, because the Kasses had executed the informed
consent document indicating that in the event of any unforeseen
circumstances, the court held that the Kass embryos be retained by the IVF
Program for scientific research.1
75
III. THE VATICAN'S PLAN FOR THE "PRENATAL ADOPTION"OF THE
FROZEN EMBRYO
On July 24, 1996, the Vatican announced that married women
170 663 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
171 Id. at 588.
, Id. at 590. "Although the plaintiff submitted 170 pages of exhibits, including




17' 663 N.Y.S.2d at 590. It should be noted that there is a motion to stay the order of
the Appellate Division pending the appeal granted to the Court of Appeals. See Kass v. Kass,
Mo. No. 1343 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 1997).
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should volunteer and bring unwanted frozen embryos to term. 17 6 The event
that prompted such a plea was the destruction of thousands of frozen
embryos in fertilization clinics in England.177 A British law has mandated
the destruction of embryos after being in a frozen state for five years.'
The law took effect on August 1, 1991, and on August 1, 1996, the five-
year time limit had passed and British clinics had to prepare for the
destruction. 179 Some sought injunctive relief to save their tiny embryos
from such peril.' A doctor at the Bourn Hall Clinic in Cambridge stated
that he had received a fax from a couple requesting that their embryos be
stored for the extended five years, however, their letter was 24 hours too
late."' Their embryos had already been destroyed.18 2
Outraged at this destruction, 18 3 Rev. Maunizio Faggioni stated in
17' Dowling, supra note 25, at IA.
"See id. See also Walsh, supra note 14, at 10. In Britain, there were approximately
9,000 fertilized embryos frozen between 1985 and 1991. "Britain was probably ripe for such
a debate, given that the country pioneered IVF and resorts to the procedure today at a per capita
rate that is among the world's highest." Id.
'
78Human Fertilisation [sic] and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37, § 14 (Eng.). See also
Raebum, supra note 24, at 42. See also Court Blocks Destruction of Frozen Embryo, Austin
American-Statesman, Aug. 4, 1996, at A12. The British law also provides that the five-year-old
embryos will be destroyed unless a couple jointly instructs for the embryos to be stored for
another five years, or they donate them to research or another woman. Id. See Walsh, supra
note 14, at 10. Of these 9,000 embryos, the clinics were able to reach the "parents" of 6,000 of
the embryos, leaving a little over 3,000 "potential infants.., in a limbo where the law dictated
that they must be destroyed." Id. Clinics tried to reach these "parents" through many efforts,
including sending up to three registered letters. Id.
17 See Walsh, supra note 14, at 10. Clinicians thawed out approximately 3,300
frozen embryo cultures, they added "drops of saline solution or alcohol to assure their
destruction," and then incinerated them with other biological waste. Id.
"' Jojo Moyes, A World ofAnguish in an Inch of Glass, Independent (London), at
1. If both the "mother" and the "father" consent, then the embryos can be stored for an
extended period of time. Id. One woman had to get a "last-minute injunction" because her




,' Walsh, supra note 14, at 10. The Church is not the only one upset by this
destruction, "many people everywhere are very uneasy with the idea of dictated destruction of
human life, however primitive and miniature." Id. People across Europe offered to "adopt" the
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L'Osservatore Romano, the Catholic Church's official newspaper in the
Vatican, that destroying embryos would be "prenatal slaughter, 1 84 where
"tens of thousands of innocent lives will be legally cut short."'185 The
Vatican sees its proposal as similar to giving a home to an orphan, where
this would be treated as a "prenatal adoption.0 86
The Catholic Church does not condone IVF.'87 The Vatican, in a
document defining the moral standards of the Catholic Church, 88
condemned the IVF process." 9 The Church opposes these advances
because they interfere with the natural transmission of life.' The
document states that "human procreation can rightfully occur only through
frozen embryos. Lemonick, supra note 23, at 41.
'84 Dowling, supra note 25, at IA. The Vatican's announcement was on July 23,
1996, 10 days before the five year period was up. Id. The Vatican was hoping to save 6,000
frozen embryos from being destroyed. Id. See also Walsh, supra note 14, at 10. Prolife
demonstrators assembled for a candlelight vigil outside Westminster Cathedral in London the
night before the destruction took place. Id. See also Lemonick, supra note 23, at 41 (stating
that memorial services were held afterwards).
185 Dowling, supra note 25, at IA.
186 Id. There is assumed to be much controversy over this proposal. David Olive,
professor of obstetrics and gynecology at Yale, stated, "[t]he idea that you produced an embryo
that will be given to someone else will not be acceptable to many. For some couples, it's an
extraordinary emotional issue." Id. Butsee Kolata, supra note 15, at 32. One doctor stated that
"nearly all [couples] who did not want to keep their embryos wanted to donate them to other
couples." Id. Lemonick, supra note 23, at 41. "Childless couples bitterly lamented that they
would gladly have taken the embryos for themselves." Id. See also Moyes, supra note 180, at
1. "Mrs. A donated her'spare' embryos... [a]s a result of the donation, yesterday morning Mrs.
B was confirmed pregnant." Id.
187 Robertson, supra note 1, at 971.
188 Russell Chandler, Vatican Condemns Human Artificial Reproduction, L.A.
Times, Mar. 10, 1987, at 1. The forty page document is entitled, "Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity of Procreation." Id.
'89 Id. The Church also condemns other technological advances such as, artificial
insemination, embryo and sperm banks, and surrogate parenthood. Id. See also Walsh,
supra note 14, at 10 (stating that the Church "absolutely denounces research using embryos.").
" Chandler, supra note 188, at 1. See also Pope Decries "Culture of Death", The
Christian Century, Apr. 12, 1995, at 384. The Pope asserted that "[t]echniques of artificial
reproduction such as in vitro fertilization, which would seem to at the service of life ... actually
open the door to new threats against life and are morally unacceptable, since they separate
procreation from the fully human context of the conjugal act." Id.
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the sex act performed by married partners." "' "A married couple is not
automatically entitled to a child; rather, a child is 'a gift of God,' the paper
says. Thus, a married couple should not resort to what the Church calls
'morally illicit' methods such as surrogate motherhood or test tube
conception." '192 Although the Catholic Church does not condone IVF, it
holds the position that embryos constitute human life.193 The Church
considers the embryo to be a human being from the moment of conception
and therefore supports the idea that the embryos deserve the protection
accorded to all human beings. 94
Because the Vatican views the embryo as human life,195 it seems
logical that it would go as far as suggesting "prenatal adoption." This idea
of donating an unwanted frozen embryo to an infertile couple is not a new
one. 196 The State of Louisiana requires it.'97 Also, there are many IVF
clinics in the United States that provide embryo donation as a dispositional
option. 9 ' For example, University Hospital in Iowa City, Iowa is now
offering an embryo adoption program.199 Since the fall of 1996, infertile
married couples have been able to receive embryos from couples who no
longer need them.2' The director of the clinic stated that infertile couples
know how hard it is to have a child, and that they want to help other
... Chandler, supra note 188, at 1. Thus, ruling out IVF. Id.
192 Id. Also the document states that what is "technically p9ssible is not for that
very reason morally admissible." Id.
193 Roberts, supra note 1, at 971.
19 Chandler, supra note 188, at 1.
195 Id.
'96 See generally Schaefer, supra note 26. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130
(West 1993).
'
97 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 1993).
9 See Walsh, supra note 14, at 10 (stating that clinics set their own policies). See
also Charles Bullard, Embryo Adoption Program Offers Hope -And a Thicket of Questions,
Des Moines Reg., Sept. 1, 1996, at 1.
9 Bullard, supra note 198, at 1. The program is the first of its kind in the state. Id.
200 Id.
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couples.2"' Although some have criticized this program, the clinic hopes
that most people see that the embryos will be utilized for good. 202
However, this is not the only choice of disposition given to a
couple.20 3 Other choices include indefinite frozen storage," 4 donation to
embryo research,2 5 and simple destruction,2° Usually the patient executes
a disposition contract before the IVF process begins.20 7
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
If a state passed a law mandating the donation of frozen
embryos,20 8 would it violate an individual's constitutional rights? Some
argue that in order to determine the constitutionality of mandatory
"prenatal adoption," the statutes would have to be analyzed in light of the
201 Id. (stating that it would "add an important service for people who otherwise
would be considering adoption").
202 Id. It is conceded that although this program is not perfect, it is cautious and
will give use for the over supply of frozen embryos. Id.
23 See Walsh, supra note 14, at 10. Many couples have different views concerning
the disposition of the frozen embryo, where one "infertile would-be-parent" stated, "[tihese lives
are in suspension in an icy tomb. In this messy ethical problem, Ive concluded that the rights
of the individual who's been brought into existence are paramount over and above those of
parents, doctors or scientists." Id.
204 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 149.
25 Id. See also June Coleman, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional
Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 Pac. L.J. 1331, 1333-34
(1996). It is argued that embryo research "may lead to better in vitro fertilization techniques,
cures for fatal disedfses, prevention of congenital defects, or allow parents to make reproductive
decisions regarding abortion." Id.
206 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 149.
207 Id. Disposition agreements are defined as "contacts between the IVF patients,
doctors, and clinics that provide for the disposition of any in vitro embryos in the event of
specified contingencies." Id. at 148.
MSee LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 1993). Louisiana has already done this,
however no controversy concerning this statute has arisen yet.
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Supreme Court decisions involving the right to privacy.20 9
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law..., Over the years, the Supreme
Court has expanded the idea of liberty to include certain rights. 1 In
Meyer v. Nebraska,212 the Court found a liberty interest in the right to
"contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God... and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. 21 ' Twenty years later, the Court affirmed the right to procreate.
214
It further expanded the concept of liberty to include the right to privacy in
the marital relationship. 21 5 Later on, the Court incorporated the right to
privacy in unmarried relationships. 21 '6 The "zones of privacy" have come
to establish a constitutional right to privacy, which the Court held to
protect the right to procreate,21 7 to use contraception,218 to have an
209 See Schaefer, supra note 26, at 98 (stating that whether one would have a
fundamental right to decide the disposition of their embryo is determined by the right to
privacy).
10 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
211 See infra notes 222-262 and accompanying text giving detailed discussions of the
Court expanding the notion of "liberty."
2 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
213 Id. at 399.
"
4See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma
statute that sterilized criminals convicted two or more times for crimes "amounting to felonies
involving moral turpitude" violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the "right to have
offspring").
215 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy which is
within the penumbra of specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights).
216 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was unconstitutional
and violated the Equal Protection Clause).
2"7 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 535.
..8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479.
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abortion, 219 to define one's own family structure, 220 and to marry.221 It is
important to analyze and understand these rights in order to ascertain
whether a state could pass a law requiring "prenatal adoption" of
unwanted frozen embryos.
A. The Right to Procreate
The Supreme Court first enunciated the fundamental right to
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma.222 In Skinner, the Court invalidated an
Oklahoma statute which provided for involuntary sterilization of persons
convicted three times of felonies showing "moral turpitude," but which did
not apply to "white-collar" crimes, such as embezzlement. 2 3 Although
this case was decided on equal protection grounds, it was motivated by
substantive due process concerns. 22' The Court objected to the
discrimination between the two types of crimes,225 but emphasized that it
strictly scrutinized the discrimination because "[m]arriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."226
219 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (holding that there is a fundamental right to have
an abortion).
220 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to force one to live in a defined and narrow family structure).
221 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a Virginia statute
which prohibited interracial marriages infringed on the fundamental right to marry), See also
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that a Wisconsin statute exceeded the
bounds of permissible state regulation of marriage, and therefore infringed on the fundamental
right to marry).
222 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
223 Id. at 536-37. The statute provided that "offenses arising out of the violation of
the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, shall not come or be
considered within the terms of the Act." Id.
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B. The Right Not to Procreate
1. The Right to Contraception
In Griswold v. Connecticut,227 the Supreme Court struck down a
statute that forbade the use of contraceptives.2" The Court found that
several of the Bill of Rights' guarantees protects privacy interests and
created a "penumbra" or "zone of privacy." '229 The Court found that the
use of contraceptives fell into this "zone of privacy."230  The Court
questioned, "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for tell tale signs of the use of contraceptives?""23 The
Court concluded that "[t]he very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship. ,
232
The Court expanded its meaning of Griswold in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.233 The statute in Eisenstadt stated that only registered physicians
and pharmacies could distribute contraceptives, and only to married
persons. 21' The Court held that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 235 Therefore,
it seems that no person may be prohibited from using contraception or
otherwise be subjected to undue interference with decisions on
procreation.
227 381 U.S. 479.
228 Id. at 480. The statute also forbids any one, from aiding or counseling another
in the use of contraceptives. Id.
229 Id. at 484 (stating that the right of association is contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches also has a
penumbra that protects privacy interests, as do the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
230 Id. at 485.
231 Id.
U2 Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 at 485-86. The Court stated that they are dealing with a
right of privacy "older than the Bill of Rights." Id.
233 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
234 Id. at 439.
235 Id. at 453.
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2. The Right to an Abortion
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,236 the Supreme Court held
that a woman's right to privacy is a "fundamental right" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 37 The Court pointed to Griswold as well as to
other cases where the Court found a right to privacy. 38 The Court found
that this right of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. "239 The Court laid out
a trimester framework where it prescribed a different rule for each. 240
During the first trimester, a state may not ban, or even closely regulate,
abortions.24" ' During the second trimester, a state may protect its interest
in the mother's health by regulating the abortion procedure in ways
"reasonably related" to her health.242 At the beginning of the third
trimester, the fetus becomes viable, and a state may therefore regulate, or
even proscribe, abortion."'
However, in a recent decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
Court partially overturned Roe.2" Although the Court did not explicitly
overrule Roe, some important aspects of that decision were overturned,
giving a state more leeway to regulate the abortion process.245 In this case,
a Pennsylvania statute placed significant regulations on abortion, such as
a twenty-four hour waiting period before an abortion could be performed
and a requirement that women notify their husbands of their intention to
have an abortion.246 The Court first reaffirmed the central holding of
"6 410 U.S. 113.
.
7 Id. at 153.
'
8 See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing freedom in education and child-rearing).
239 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
24 01 d. at 162-63.
2' Id. at 164.
242Id. '
243 Id. at 164-65.
244 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
245 Id.
246 Id. at 844.
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Roe,24 7 as to each of its three parts: 1) a woman has a right to an
"abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from
the state;" '248 2) a state has the power to restrict abortions after fetal
viability, "if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering a
woman's life or health;" '249 and 3) a state has "legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life
of the fetus that may become a child."25 The Court agreed "that the
Constitution places limits on a State's rights to interfere with a person's
most basic decisions about family and parenthood." 25 ' The Court also
noted that both contraception and abortion "involve personal decisions
concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human
responsibility and respect for it. 252
The Court overturned two aspects of Roe. First, the Court did not
agree that the trimester approach was a necessary method of safeguarding
a woman's right to choose whether or not to exercise her right to an
abortion. 253 The Court stated that the problem with the trimester approach
was that it "undervalues the State's interest in potential life," because it
completely ignores that interest during the first two trimesters.254 The
Court replaced the trimester framework with a new "undue burden"
standard.2" The Court stated, "Only where state regulation imposes an
undue burden on a woman's ability to make [the decision to abort] does
the power of the State reach into the heart of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause., 25 Second, the Court rejected Roe's view that the right
247 Id. at 846.
249 Id.
249 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 846.
250 Id.
" Id. at 849.
2.2 Id. at 853.
23 Id. at 872.
254 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 873. The Court also noted that another basic
flaw of the trimester framework is that it also "misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's
interest." Id. at 875.
255 Id. at 876-77.
256 id.,
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to an abortion is a "fundamental right," and that every pre-viability
restriction on abortion must withstand "strict scrutiny. ',257 The Court
further stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life."'8
From these decisions, one can see a right to privacy concerning
marriage and family relations. The burdens of an unwanted pregnancy and
childrearing are deemed so substantial that any person--married or single--
may choose to use contraception to avoid pregnancy, or have an abortion
if pregnancy does result. 9 Because of the fundamental nature of the right
to privacy, a state must show a compelling state interest in order to
interfere with these rights.26  However, it is important to note that the
Court implicitly rejected the notion that one has a "fundamental right to an
abortion. '" 261  Although the Court did not explicitly discuss this issue of
"fundamental right," it can be assumed that abortion is no longer a
"fundamental right," and a state's restrictions do not have to survive the
.57 Id. The "undue burden" standard implicitly overrules the strict scrutiny
standard that is given to fundamental rights.2581d. at 851.
"" See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (holding that banning the right to
use contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(holding that it is unconstitutional to deny distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (holding that there is a fundamental right to an
abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (holding that a state regulation is
unconstitutional only where it imposes an "undue burden").
... See supra notes 208-262 and accompanying text.
261 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court did not
apply strict scrutiny to the Pennsylvania statute, but rather the "undue burden" test. Id.
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strict scrutiny standard.262
V. Is THE "PRENATAL ADOPTION" OF FROZEN EMBRYO
CONSTITUTIONAL?
It can be said that those couples who have gone through the IVF
process have exercised their right to procreate. 263 But, it appears that
because their embryo is frozen, their right to procreate has been "frozen"
as well. However, a problem arises when there is an excess of fertilized
embryos that the couple does not intend to use.264 If a state should pass a
law mandating "prenatal adoption" of the unwanted embryos, 26 how
would a court determine such a statute's constitutionality? Would a court
use the Supreme Court decisions concerning the right to privacy as a
framework?266 Or is it possible that no constitutional rights are being
infringed upon at all, and thus, such a statute is constitutional?
A. The Right to Privacy to Use Contraception Analysis
The Court decided in Griswold and Eisenstadt that within the right
to privacy there is a right to use contraceptives, allowing a couple to
decide whether to procreate. 67 In terms of IVF, when a couple decides
not to use their embryo, they are essentially deciding not to procreate. A
couple who decides to use contraceptives is very similar to a couple who
262 See id.
263 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 956 (arguing that the freedom to procreate
through the means of IVF should be recognized because that may be the only way for the
person to reproduce).
26 Perry & Schneider, supra note 15, at 463-64.
263 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 1993). Although one state, Louisiana,
has already adopted such a law, no case concerning the statute has arisen.
26 See supra notes 191-241 and accompanying text.
267See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1971). See also supra notes 227-235 and accompanying text analyzing the Courts
decisions.
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decides to destroy their e mbryo.2 68 For example, a woman who uses post-
fertilization. birth control, such as an IUD (intra-uterine device), is similar
to a woman who decides to destroy her frozen embryo.2 69  In both
situations, it is destroyed before implantation.27 Therefore, although from
this analysis it seems that a state may not be able to prohibit a couple's
choice to destroy their embryo, it is not clear where a statute mandating
"prenatal adoption" would stand.27" '
Even though there is a right to use contraceptives, several
distinctions should be noted in terms of IVF.272 When a couple
participates in an IVF program, they embark on a long, thought-out
decision to try to procreate. 27' Also, contraception is a means to prevent
fertilization.274  With IVF, however, fertilization has occurred, and the
embryo is outside of a woman's body.275 Furthermore, the decision
whether or not to have a child is less private in the context of IVF than in
the context of contraceptives.276 IVF is considered less private because the
procedures are performed in IVF clinics and under a physician's care: 2
77
In the situation where a couple decides to use contraceptives, this decision
is usually made in private and without a physician's input.27  In the case
268 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 109.
269 Id.
270 id.
271 Brown, supra note 16, at 232 (arguing that "[t]he decision not to implant a pre-
embryo is based on the same premise as the decision to use contraceptives: a desire not to bear
or beget a child.").
272 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 110 (arguing that the right to privacy protecting the
use of contraceptives may not extend to IVF).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 109.
271 Id. at 110.
216 Id. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (stating that the
decision to use contraceptives occurs in the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms").
277 Schaefer, supra note 26, at 110. Once the egg and sperm have been retrieved
from the donors, the fertilization procedure occurs outside of the body. Id.
"S7 ee Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86. The Court stated "[w]ould we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship." Id.
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of IVF, a couple must consult physicians and discuss success rates, cost
and numerous medical and ethical concerns. 19  Because of these
differences, it does not seem that one can use the right to use
contraception analysis to determine whether or not a state could
constitutionally pass a statute concerning the "prenatal adoption" of the
frozen embryo.
B. The Right to Privacy to an Abortion Analysis
Because there is a significant difference between a fetus and an
embryo, in terms of physiological development and location, there is a.
significant difference between an abortion and "prenatal adoption."' In
Kass v. Kass, the New York Appellate Division criticized the lower court
for "... equating a prospective mother's decision" with a pregnant
woman's right to an abortion. 281 The court stated that a woman's right
"over her own body is not implicated in the IVF scenario until such time
as implantation actually occurs, for it is only then that her bodily integrity
is at issue." '282 Such an analysis would be improper because mandatory
donation does not force unwanted gestation or child rearing on a
woman.2"3 The embryo is in a frozen state in a clinic, and not inside a
woman's body.284 The woman who provided the egg will not be forced
to bear or rear this potential offspring.285
It is argued that what is at stake is the "possibility of an
anonymous hereditary tie,, 2 6 which would be the only burden placed on
279 Schaefer, supra note 26, at I 10.
280 Robertson, supra note 1, at 971.
281 663 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
282 Id.
283 Robertson, supra note 1, at 978-79 (stating that "the Supreme Court's birth
control and abortion precedents are not directly on point, since the procreation sought to be
avoided in those cases involved unwanted gestation or [child] rearing.").
284 Id. at 979.
285 See id. It is presumed that "[tihe couple will . . . never see, hear from nor
indeed, even know whether a biological descendant was ever born." Id.
286 Robertson, supra note 1, at 979.
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the donating couple. 87 Some argue that this psychological burden could
vary."'8 Some may find it troubling to know that there may be a child
biologically theirs that is being raised by someone else.289 Others may feel
guilty and want to contact the child,29 and others may not be affected by
this at all.291
If the courts use the Supreme Court's analysis from Casey, the
constitutionality of a "prenatal adoption" statute depends on whether such
a statute places an "undue burden" on the donating couple.2 92 Because it
is no longer necessary that the state's interests be compelling, 93 it is only
necessary that the state places no "undue burden" on the donating
couple.2 94 The only burden that would be placed on the couple is of a
psychological nature and not physical like in Roe and Casey.2 95 Because
of this, a court may not see a "psychological burden" as an "undue
burden,"296 and find that the state's interest in potential life outweighs any
287 id.
288 id.
289 Id. See also Schaefer, supra note 26, at 105. It is argued that even though the
woman does not physically bear the child, and emotional attachment to the child nonetheless
develops. Id. Also it is stated that one would not say that "a man has no emotional attachment
to his biological children just because he did not physically bear those children. Similarly, it
would be unrealistic to argue that, because the woman did not physically bear the child, and the
couple did not experience the pregnancy, no emotional attachment to that child could exist." Id.
at 106.
290 Robertson, supra note 1, at 979. It is also stated that some donating couples
fear that the child will try to make contact with them in the future in order to form a relationship
or for financial gain. Id. at 980.
'91 Id. at 980. Some may not feel a negative impact at all and "may even be a
source of satisfaction once established." Id. It is also stated that some people may feel proud
or satisfied "that they have genetic heirs about in the world," because "they have replicated
more of their genes than have others." Id. at 980 n.138.
... See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
293 Id. The Court did not apply the strict scrutiny standard, but rather the "undue
burden" standard. Id. This standard overrules the strict scrutiny standard that was applied in
Roe v. Wade. Id.
294/Id.
295 Robertson, supra note 1, at 979.
296See supra notes 244-258 and accompanying text giving a detailed discussion of the
Supreme Court's "undue burden" standard.
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psychological burden placed on the donating couple.297
Whether it is proper to analyze a mandatory donation statute with
the right to privacy or not is unclear due to the sparse amount of IVF
legislation and judicial guidance. However, if analyzed under the right to
privacy, such a statute would be constitutional because it would not
interfere with a couple's right to bear or beget a child, nor place any undue
burdens on them.
VI. CONCLUSION
For most, the birth of a child is a very joyous occasion.
Unfortunately for various reasons some cannot experience it. Advances
have been made, and through technology, infertile couples are now able
to experience the joys of parenthood.298 IVF is a process where eggs and
sperm are retrieved and placed in a petri dish so fertilization occurs.299
Cryopreservation involves the freezing of the embryo so it can be
preserved and implanted at a later date."° IVF and cryopreservation give
couples a better chance in producing a child. 0 However, there are many
legal and ethical problems that come along with these technological
advances." 2
There are several theories as to what the frozen embryo
constitutes.30 3 There is the theory that the frozen embryo is property
because it is simple human tissue. 4 Another theory is that it constitutes
human life because of scientific proof that the embryo is biologically
297 Robertson, supra note 1, at 980 (noting that it is possible that the Supreme
Court would find it within the state's power to implement law that would provide for
mandatory donation of frozen embryos).
298 Id. at 944.
299 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 133.
3 O ld. at 134.
301 Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, supra note 5, at 1584.
302 Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 6, at 329.
303 Davidoff, supra note 8, at 137.
304 Id
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alive.3"5 The third theory is the special respect theory where the embryo
is not 'given the full status afforded to human beings, but are not
considered mere property either.306
To date, only six states have adopted legislation regarding IVF.3 °7
The amount of case law concerning IVF is also sparse.3 °8 The cases show
that the disposition of the frozen embryo creates a huge legal and ethical
problem not only for the couples involved, but for the courts as well.309
It is up for the courts to decide who owns the frozen embryo, the couple
or the clinic;310 in the event of a divorce who gets the frozen embryo, the
woman where she wants to donate it, or the man who wants to destroy
it; 31 1 or in such a case where the woman wants to have the embryo
implanted, and the man does not want to be a father.3"2 These delicate and
personal issues will be difficult for any court to decide.
In July, 1996, the Vatican announced a proposal where married
women should volunteer and bring unwanted frozen embryos to term.31 3
Horrified by the fact that many embryos are unused and destroyed, the
Vatican considers such destruction to be a "prenatal slaughter."3 4 If such
a proposal were implemented, the unwanted frozen embryo resulting from
IVF would be donated, and another willing couple would "prenatally
adopt" it.315
If a state should pass such a statute, there would be a question as
305 Id.
306 id.
3O7See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123-133 (West 1993); FLA. ST. ANN. § 742.17
(West 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (c) (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715
(Baldwin 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (1992).
308 See e.g., No. 74-3558, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978); 717 F. Supp. 421
(E.D. Va. 1989); 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997).
309 See generally No. 74-3558, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978); 717 F. Supp.
421 (E.D. Va. 1989); 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997).310 See 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
31 See 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
312 See 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997).




to its constitutionality. A court could analyze whether or not it infringed
upon the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has determined that within the right to
privacy there is a fundamental right to procreate.3"6 Furthermore, there is
also the right not to procreate through the means of contraceptives 317 and
abortion."1 Some argue that the constitutionality of a statute that provides
for the "prenatal adoption" of the frozen embryo involves analyzing it in
terms of the right to privacy.319 While others argue that such an analysis
would be improper 2.3 ' However, if such an analysis is used, it appears that
a statute mandating the "prenatal adoption" of the unwanted frozen
embryo does not infringe on one's right to procreate, and places no "undue
burden" on the donating couple, and is thus constitutional.
Janette M Puskar
316 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that there is a fundamental
right to procreate).
31 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that there is a right to
privacy to use contraceptives).
3 8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that there is a fundamental right to
an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that a state
regulation is unconstitutional only where it imposes an "undue burden").
319 Robertson, supra note 1, at 978.
320 See Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 585-86.
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